Editor’s Note: What follows is part of a cross-blog survey that sheds light on the rich ethnic tapestry of Central Asia.

Prior to the events of March 2005, Kyrgyzstan was probably best known for the fact that representatives of more than 80 ethnic groups reside within its borders and a key slogan under Akaev was “Kyrgyzstan - our common home”. Indeed, former President Akaev placed considerable emphasis on trying to ensure that the republic’s ethnic diversity was maintained, not least as the large numbers of Russians who left in the 1990s - 313,357 left between 1989 and 1999 according to official census figures - represented a considerable proportion of the country’s educated workforce.

In addition to the eventual granting of Russian official language status in 2000, one of the main mechanisms for ensuring the formal representation and inclusion of ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan was the founding of the Assamblea of the People of Kyrgyzstan in 1994. This body, which has been described as a “peoples’ parliament”, was created to work towards “all kinds of cooperation for the strengthening of harmony between all nationalities ?nd the unity of the people of Kyrgyzstan” in the words of the Assamblea’s statutes.

Writing in the second issue of Etnicheskii mir (1998), the journal of the Institute of Ethnic Politics (formerly the Information-Research Centre of the Assamblea of the People of Kyrgyzstan until Janaury 2003, Aleksei Fukalov wrote of the Assamblea in glowing terms:

The formation and development of the Assamblea of the People of Kyrgyzstan creates a precedent for a fundamentally new approach to the formation of the mechanisms and technology of public regulation of interethnic relations. The novelty of this approach is in the founding of state-civic forms of optimisation of nationality politics on the basis of, on the one hand, the delegation of the state of its authority to public structures, and, on the other hand, the acceptance by these social structures of responsibility for supporting and consolidating accord between nationalities. Such a conglomerative (or integrative) type of cooperation in the activities of the state and civil society is unique in world practice.

Whilst this description undoubtedly sounds impressive, a little reading between the lines in good Soviet fashion gives cause for doubt: there seems to be a lot of room for the government to carefully pass the buck for interethnic relations to the constituent members of the Assamblea - namely the national-cultural organisations that represent many of the different ethnic groups present in Kyrgyzstan.

Given that this careful removal of ethnicity from “Politics” (as opposed to just politics, which is omnipresent in Kyrgyzstan) and leaving it to the civil sector was evident as long ago as 1998, perhaps I should not have been surprised that interethnic relations were not a government priority after the March events of 2005. Indeed, all the evidence in Bishkek from the numerous and diverse protests suggested that ethnicity wasn’t the priority for the majority of people.

Yet the fact that the president of one of the more active national-cultural associations who told me bluntly that “ethnic relations are not a priority for the government, they haven’t got that far yet”, going on to add he “would like to believe that it’s just that they haven’t got round to it yet, but they did promise that they will address the issue” in November 2005 made me think about the actual role of the national-cultural organisations. What did they actually do? How did they see interethnic relations and the situation in Kyrgyzstan more generally? Did the Russians see things the same way as the Uighurs or Uzbeks, for example?

As part of my fieldwork in Bishkek (September 2005-January 2006) and Osh (March-June 2006) I interviewed representatives of several national-cultural organisations. It became very apparent that the situation in Kyrgyzstan regarding ethnic minorities was viewed quite differently in Bishkek and Osh, with my interviewees in Bishkek focusing more on formal politics and representation, whilst everyday issues often relating to “bytovoj natsionalism” or everyday nationalism being of greater concern to those in Osh.

Regardless of the specific issues mentioned, however, the common theme was very much an awareness that exploitation of the “ethnic question” would only harm everyone, as Rozimukhamed Akhmetovich Abdulbakiev, Chairman of the Uighur National-Cultural Association Ittipak explained:

… today we should be raising Kyrgyzstani patriots, that is, so that people’s mentality is changed, that they identify themselves not by ethnicity, but so that their civil identity is placed higher […] If everyone of us, as some people do, sees ourselves purely in terms of “ethnic egoism” then we’re going to have problems here and we’ll never escape from them. […] It is because of this that I consider our (people who work in this sphere) mission to make this clear to people and say to them “people, we’re all in the same boat together”.

At the same time, Uighurs are very aware of how attitudes to them can change very quickly, not least due to Kyrgyzstan’s relations with China and/or a negative article in the media, and this often has knock-on effects for “ordinary ” Uighurs:

Things [the position of Uighurs] usually get worse after something anti-Uighur, something “Uighurophobic” or similar is published in the mass media. […] relations between Kyrgyzstan and China are a very sore spot for us. As soon as someone from the government goes to China, or some sort of humanitarian assistance is given to Kyrgyzstan, then I know to expect that in a few days, or in a week’s time there’ll be some article published somewhere about Uighur extremism or terrorism.

Returning to the more everyday level, Abdulbakiev pointed out that often interethnic relations are strained by the intersection between socio-economic circumstances and perceived ethnic inequality:

… today there are very many economic and social problems that cannot be solved quickly. And everyone says that Uighurs live better than the native Kyrgyz, well, I’m sorry, in such cases I usually reply: “Look, there are your neighbours, how many hours a day do I work, how many do you work? Look, there are my sons, how much do they work, and they look at their own sons and they’re lying around, not looking for work. I’m not stealing anyone’s work, I have my own, I won’t take someone else’s.

Similarly, Valerii Vyshnevskii, of the Russian Slavyanskii Fond in Bishkek, noted the division of labour along ethnic lines:

… almost 500,000 Russian have left. In general it is literate people who have left, managers and so on. And those Russians who have stayed, well, it’s difficult to say what percentage [are discriminated against]. They occupy their own niche, firstly, and it is a niche that representatives of other [nationalities] find it difficult to access. For example, if we take workshops where electrical devices are repaired, then Russians dominate there, Dungans or Uzbeks won’t go into it. Russians also dominate in the sphere of engineering communications…

Whilst this may be true, particularly in the capital, Russians in Osh are less optimistic, talking of problems of informal discrimination, particularly in light of competition between the two dominant ethnic groups in the city, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.

In contrast to Bishkek, interethnic relations are more visible in Osh, with far fewer “Europeans” and some statistics putting Uzbeks in the majority. Back in 1990 interethnic riots, subsequently known as the “Osh conflict” claimed the lives of between 100-300 people, mainly Uzbek and Kyrgyz, and the memory of these events is still strong. Arguably, this has served to keep any interethnic tensions below critical level as people are all too aware of the possible consequences. Yet with socio-political and economic stability continuing in post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan, there are rumours of growing tensions. As one Russian in Osh told me “fifteen years have passed and the Uzbeks won’t forgive…”

Certainly, a common theme in conversations I had in Osh was that Osh used to be an Uzbek city until independence and that “the Kyrgyz live thanks to other nationalities, we’ve taught them everything, the Uzbeks are cooks, traders… Instead of blaming us it would be better for them to say thank you to their Uzbek brothers.”

Even on a formal level, the government seems less inclined to try and include the country’s considerable Uzbek population, preferring to take the line “put up and shut up or go “back” to Uzbekistan”. Considering the events of Andijan and the general state of affairs in the neighbouring republic, this may not seem much of an option. Moreover, as my conversant noted, “Kyrgyzstan is my homeland, I was born here, where am I supposed to go?”

Following protests demanding official status for the Uzbek language in Jalalabad in May 2006, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities, Rolf Ekeus, met with representatives of the Uzbek community and subsequently called on the Kyrgyz government “to engage in constant dialogue” with ethnic minorities. This did not go down well with the government, as Kabar reported on 6 June 2005 (13.42), quoting Secretary of State Adakhan Madumarov:

We have a unitary state, and it is not the state’s policy to look for problems where there aren’t any. Every time, we hear that we give little significance to the development of ethnic minorities. The state and the authories are doing everything possible to ensure that national minorities and diasporas feel themselves sufficiently free. We could raise the same matter in Uzbekistan, there ethnic Kyrgyz do not feel as comfortable as Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan do.

Uzbek television works here, the Uzbek press works on an equal level with the state and official languages. Therefore, High Commissioner, I would say that the more attention we pay [to this issue], the more criticism we hear. I categorically refute it and refuse to accept it.

More recently, Ferghana.ru reported on an incident of anti-Uzbek grafitti in Osh, noting the total lack of reaction from the public and the authorities alike:

Sarts, Get Out” graffiti appealed at the intersections of Alisher Navoi and Aitiyev streets in the city of Osh. Who sprayed it on the walls of the building of the former municipal truck fleet or why is anybody’s guess for the time being. The locals say that the graffiti appeared long ago but law enforcement agencies or authorities - local and regional - never paid attention.

Literally thousands pass and drive by every day - Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians. The regional office of the Traffic Police is nearby, its officers regulating traffic right in front of the building in question. People see the graffiti without a murmur of protest. They pretend that they do not see this sprayed insult to the Uzbeks living in Osh since time out of mind. The same attitude is displayed by Mayor of Osh Jumadyl Isakov, Governor Jantoro Satybaldiyev, prosecutor’s offices (municipal and regional), Directorate of Internal Affairs, and National Security State Committee. Not to mention Uzbek leaders, activists of Uzbek centers of national culture, Uzbek deputies of the municipal and national legislatures.

It is perhaps not surprising therefore, that some Uzbeks, even after Andijan, do not see their position in Kyrgyzstan so positively. Several women working in a tailor’s in Osh were quick to explain why they’d rather live in Uzbekistan: “at least there’s a future there, here there’s no perspectives, there’s nothing at all.”

It is this final comment that perhaps points most clearly to the underlying cause of increasing interethnic tensions: the continuing political and socio-economic instability. In these circumstances the Assamblea has lost much authority and ability to influence anything, and even less to offer support to the national-cultural organisations. Both of the national-cultural organisations still actively present in the Dom druzhby (”House of Friendship” in Osh noted that even though President Bakiev had formally taken over the Assamblea, there were no signs of anything happening, or any state support being offered.

The same could be said of many issues in Kyrgyzstan currently. Formally, there is arguably progress towards addressing key issues: certainly the government would like us to think so. The problem is that many people, including those in Kyrgyzstan, do not see any progress; their lives are unchanged at best, a sense of uncertainty and insecurity pervading their perception of the situation. As I was told by various interviewees, “there’s such a sense of fear now” [Osh, June 2005], “no-one in Kyrgyzstan feels secure because the political situation is unstable” [Bishkek, November 2005] - and the same thing could be said at the moment, as RFE/RL indicates. Writing about the second anniversary of the so-called Tulip Revolution, they note the continuing mood of dissatisfaction:

“Nothing has changed in the life of the average [Kyrgyz] person,” Samakov [a Legislator - CXW] told RFE/RL. “Take, for example, Georgia; there was a revolution there as well. There, young [people] came to power, [and] the budget of the country increased threefold. I had great hopes for the new authorities [in Kyrgyzstan], but unfortunately I was disappointed. I think that power needs to be handed over to young reformers, young people who have a new way of thinking.”

History could be coming full circle. Opposition groups are calling for President Bakiev to leave office, complaining that he has not fulfilled the ideals that sparked the events of two years ago. Demonstrations are being organized for early April, and the demands are familiar: constitutional reform, eliminating corruption, and an end to perceived rule by one family — in this case Bakiev’s. Opponents want an early presidential election.

With political uncertainty set to continue - by some estimates for at least another 2 years - it is imperative that the Kyrgyzstani (though at the moment one could also accurately say Kyrgyz, which is another reason for concern) government actively addresses interethnic relations so that existing socio-economic tensions do not get conflated into ethnic confrontation. For, as Alisher Khamidov concludes in his article on relations between Uzbeks and the state in Kyrgyzstan, “Neglecting ethnic problems can have a number of destabilizing implications not only for Kyrgyzstan but also for the entire region.”

People have been predicting the “Balkanisation” of Central Asia since 1990 or even earlier. Kyrgyzstan has much to proud of regarding interethnic relations; there is still time to avoid such horrific outcomes. But only if formal words and institutions are actually turned into dialogues and actions.