Posting from the UK for a couple of months having left Bishkek - shame not to be in the thick of things so much in a way, but on the plus side it does mean more regular postings, which can only be a good thing. There’s about a month’s worth of stories, events and political games (intrigue sounds a little too grand) to catch up on, including Kulov’s latest salvo aimed at Ryspek Akmatbaev and concerns over pressure being put on the NGO community. If you’re after a broader summary of 2005 in review, AlertNet has a basic overview of the big events. In order to make things slightly more coherent, I’ve split things into a few categories this time. So, on we go:
Domestic Politics
Constitutional reform and the debate surrounding it was covered extensively in the local media throughout December, though many people were left wondering what exactly the difference between a parliamentary and a presidential system is, as well as why there was an official public consultation period when it looked like the President was not going to pay much attention to public opinion (as such it was), nor to the monstrously huge Constutional Committee with over 289 members. Indeed, Bakiev’s enthusiasm for the whole issue seemed to wane quite considerably as the month progressed, with RFE/RL reporting on December 15 that he was in favour of postponing reforms until 2010, feeling that the country was not ready for them. At this point things came to a grinding halt until shortly after New Year, when it was decreed that there willl be a referendum on the constitution in 2006.
Concerns over the growth of organised crime and the government’s failure to get to grips with even beginning to tackle corruption in the republic led to the International Crisis Group labelling Kyrgyzstan a “faltering” state. Academic discussion of the differences between failing and faltering aside, this did at least serve to highlight just how precarious the political situation continues to be and that Bakiev’s government have to move on from scapegoating Akaev to actually tackling the problems facing them. As a Eurasianet article noted, political instability and the weakness of the government is further compounding the problem of corruption:
One Kyrgyzstan-based Western entrepreneur said conditions in Bishkek are now worse than during the Akayev era. “Investors knew if something had to be fixed, you could fix it with the Akayev family. Now there’s uncertainty of who has the power in country,” he said.
This theme was picked up by Erica Marat in her article for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, entitled “Is Bakiev Losing Legitimacy?”, which concluded that Bakiev’s government is rapidly losing public approval in a similar manner to how Akaev’s government did.
The murder of well-known sportsman Raabek Sanatbaev in Bishkek on January 10 will not have allayed concerns over the present government’s ability to keep control and the continuation of political violence. Wrestler Sanatbaev was shot in the head near his home and later died in hospital. It has been speculated that his assassination was linked to his candidature for the post of chairman of the National Olympic Committee, a version of events denied by the authorities, but which is not entirely implausible considering that this is the third death of someone with connections to the committee - former chairman Bayaman Erkinbaev was shot dead in September (the investigation concluded his murder was linked to narcobusiness interests), and field hockey federation head Kadyr Atagaraev dropped dead of an apparent heart attack during an Olympic committee meeting on January 5. OK, a conspiracy theorist’s dream in many ways, but when politics, public positions and business are so closely linked and the job carries a USD 800/month salary for its 5-year duration, there’s a good chance there’s some common motivations - the problem is finding the right one amongst all the random red herrings. Other current candidates for the position include criminal authority and President of the Fencing Association, Ryspek Akmatbaev…
… Which brings us smoothly on to more events concerning the legendary/infamous Akmatbaev, who was acquitted on charges of 3 murders and organised crime earlier this week. What took this from being just another example of the Kyrgyzstani courts caving in was Prime Minister Feliks Kulov’s repsonse, issuing a public letter naming Rysbek Akmatbaev as a threat to Kyrgyzstan’s future development:
Concern in society is clearly growing over the closeness of organised crime to the authorities. Many people know the names, but people are simply and naturally scared to say them aloud, fearing for their own safety and the lives and well-being of those close to them. But if we allow such a situation to continue, then continuing criminalisation will place the very possibility of Kyrgyzstan’s democratic and civilised development in doubt.
Thus I am obliged to name individuals whose activities, in my view, are creating exactly this danger. This person is, above all, a certain Ryspek Akmatbaev. The name of one of those responsible for the current situation is the Chairman of the National Security Service (SNB), Tashtemir Aitbaev. The work of the SNB and certain other state structures gives reason to criticise the authorities for not fighting organised crime and corruption. The most recent obvious example was the detainment of the head of the SNB’s organised crime department with weapons and narcotics. And today no-one is surprised when the courts completely exonerate suspects whose participation in particularly serious crimes is pratically undoubted.[My translation]
There is little doubt that Kulov has voiced a commonly held opinion and the NGO community has already come out in support, but all the same, for the Prime Minister to speak out so openly and fully is, to quote Regnum, “sensational”. Whilst the Zhogorku Kenesh appears to be backing Kulov and his anti-corruption stance, Ryspek Akmatbaev has already come back with fighting talk, as Gazeta.kg reports under the heading “Now I have personal scores with Kulov”. The article quotes Akmatbaev, who led protests against the Prime Minister in October following the death of his brother during a visit to a rioting prison colony in October, as saying that
Kulov is not coping with the responsibilities entrusted to him and the time when he will have to account for himself is drawing closer, and he is trying to deflect attention and gain points in the form of fighting organised crime, to which he has linked me.
Akmatbaev has also vowed to prove Kulov’s responsibility, alleging that Kulov visited the colony the day after the murder, “embraced and thanked Aziz Baktukaev for the work he had done”. Aside from the personal implications for Kulov, it also makes me wonder how the much vaunted Bakiev-Kulov tandem is doing. Despite protestations to the contrary over the last few months, Bakiev was conspiciously silent when Akmatbaev led protests demanding Kulov’s resignation and one would expect a more forthright stance from the president on the issue of corruption (and in general). Is Bakiev really so incompetent and dull witted (a good number of people have certainly suggested that over the last few months in Bishkek) or is a split a possibility, in which case it’s difficult to know who has the upper hand: Kulov might have seized the initiative, but he’s also put himself in the firing line. As usual, it’s wait and see.
Postmortems of what a few people, particularly in the international community, are still optimistically referring to as the “revolution” are still continuing, as Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst’s article “Winter for the Kyrgyz Revolution” shows. As with any discussion of the post-March period, the term instability crops up a lot, with the author echoing other analyses by noting the detrimental economic nnd political impact of the instability but being unable to suggest where things might go, other than that there are most likely going to be more changes in the coming year. However, Tom Wood of IFES recently took a more upbeat view of things in an article for Eurasianet, arguing that there are some positives:
Kyrgyzstan is an unprecedented example in Central Asia of a state challenging its modern history and political culture. The Kyrgyzstani revolution did not usher in Swiss-style democracy. Yet for the first time, the ability of average Kyrgyzstanis to influence politics has been accepted, a novel idea in post-Soviet Central Asia.
I’m a little more cynical than Tom is about the amount of influence your average Kyrgyzstani actually has without taking into account the numerous societal groupings that exist and find his argument a little abstract: the opportunity to influence politics - which people feel disillusioned with and distanced from in any case - is not much consolation for living in a permanent state of uncertainty and not seeing any prospects for improvement in the future. Even so, despite the distinctly upbeat tone of the article, the conclusion is a pragmatic one: too early to tell. Registan has a post and comments on the article, which seems to bear out axiomatic advice for assessing Kyrgyzstan, as well as politics in general: read between the lines.
It’s tempting to wonder if the maxim ‘if at first you don’t succeed…’ is behind former General Prosecutor, opposition leader and parliamentary deputy for Aksy district Azimbek Beknazarov’s proclamation that the revolution must continue. His comments were made in the context of the Peoples’ Kurultai that was held on December 24, and which was attended by many politicians of all political creeds. The Kurultai was highly critical of the apparent lack of progress seen since the events of March, and especially of the number of politicians still in power who were closely linked to Askar Akaev and his family, issuing a list of 30 people who, in thier opinion, should be removed from government posts. A new opposition does appear to be forming in the republic in the form of various parties and coalitions; Roza Otunbaeva is now co-chair of the “Asaba” party with Azimbek Beknazarov, and a new political bloc, the People’s Coalition of Democratic Forces formed earlier this month. However, as RFE/RL notes in relation to the People’s Coalition of Democratic Forces, there are concerns over how effective many of these alliances can be with such diverse political membership and the weakness of the vast majority of political parties, which tend to focus on one person, creating ‘personality’ politics. On a related note, IWPR notes the influence of clans on voters’ choices, which presents a further obstacle to the creation of a more party-based political system.
A bomb blast in Osh on December 24 was reportedly the work of terrorists, concluded Kyrgyzstani authorities, who originally thought the explosion might have been caused by faulty electrical equipment or gas cannister. TMCNet quoted Interior Minister Murat Sutalinov as saying that the explosion was organised by terrorist organisations who needed to show evidence of their activity and existence to their donors. Criminal proceedings have been opened.
The existing moratorium on the death penalty was due to expire at the end of 2005, inevitbly moving the issue up the political agenda. Discussion in the local press showed much support both for and against, plus a good deal of consideration for logistical matters, not least the poor conditions in many prisons and colonies that caused riots earlier last year. In the end President Bakiev issued a decree extending the moratorium with a view to implementing reforms to led to its abolition, reports ABC News.
Another major issue that has emerged over the last couple of weeks is concerns over government plans to check on foreign funded NGOs in order to ascertain which ones are a threat to national security. Distinct echoes of Russia’s recent law… Despite offficials denying that NGOs are being targeted and the order related to the activities of various missionary groups, the NGO community has interpreted the order as evidence of growing authoritarian tendencies and has already issued statements expressing their concern that this may be part of a tacit campaign to silence or at least restrict civil society on the part of both the government and organised crime, as Erica Marat argues in her article on the role of civil society in the republic after March 24.
Concern is also growing that press freedom may be under threat once more following the conflict over the Piramida TV and radio station with news that journalists from Litsa and Komsomolskaya Pravda have been warned that they could be charged with libel for criticising President Bakiev. This has heightened fears that methods that were commonly used to control the media under Akaev may become more widespread once more and has led to criticism from human rights activists at home and abroad.
The Uzbek community is Kyrgyzstan is the subject of articles by Eurasianet and Ferghana.ru, both of which note increasing dissatisfaction over discrimination and corruption, which, as the Eurasianet article points out, are closely interconnected. Ferghana.ru takes a similar line, but highlights the Uzbek community’s fear of growing nationalism and how this will impact on their position, particularly with regards to inter-ethnic relations, an issue the government has been largely silent on since coming to power.
Fears of unrest or violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan have also been intensified by Bakiev’s sacking of the governor of Jalalabadskaya oblast, Jusupjan Jeenbekov on January 23, apparently as part of a policy of rotation, which led to protests in Jalalabad. As IWPR comments, resentment in the south is growing over the seemingly arbitrary decisions Bishkek is taking, and some people are wondering what Bakiev’s game plan is (assuming he has one) and how far he can push the volatile south. It has been suggested that this is part of a continuing trend to remove the “revolutionaries” who participated in the events of March and reinstate members of the previous regime. RFE/RL reports that Jeenbekov met with the President on the 24th, after which he said that he was still the ‘acting’ governor of the oblast, but the final outcome has yet to be decided. A government official downplayed the significance of these protests:
The situation in Jalalabad is calm. A group of people has simply expressed unhappiness with the president’s decision,” said Miroslav Niyazov, secretary of the Security Council. “I don’t think this situation is going to affect stability in the country in any way. Perhaps some people really want destabilisation, but everything is under control.
However, even more optimistic members of civil society recognise the seriousness of the current situation:
Edil Baisalov, head of the NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, takes the latter view. “This situation needs to be seen as unpredictable and unstable,” he told IWPR. “Clearly, the political situation in Kyrgyzstan at the moment is much more dangerous than it was at the beginning of 2005.
Finally for domestic news, a quick heads up about an AlertNet article on how prostitution is leading to an increase in HIV/AIDS cases in Bishkek and other parts of the country, and an IRIN piece on the particular problems women in Kyrgyzstan face getting their property rights recognised.
International Politics
Somewhat inevitably given the vast figures being bandied around, debate over new rent rates for the Ganci Airbase at Manas International Airport has continued, not least after ministers decided that the revenue from ground rent should be going to the state, not to the airport. New terms - including a hundred-fold rent increase - was presented to the Americans in mid-January, reports RFE/RL. The Americans have not yet responded officially, with RIA Novosti reporting on January 6 that talks had resumed, but it is difficult to see them pulling out of Kyrgyzstan at the present time whilst operations in Afghanistan continue. RFE/RL reported today that the Kyrgyzstani government has sent an official document its new terms to the US Ambassador in Bishkek. Even so, the Kyrgyzstani government would do well to remember that pressuring a golden goose, particularly given the current delicate investment climate, can be a risky business; talk of “national interests” is all well and good, but on a pragmatic level ensuring the continuation of US economic and political support is also in the national interest, particularly for a government that has given many people the impression of being incapable of improving the present socio-economic situation without heavy reliance on international donors and investors. On the other hand, as Vladimir Socor writing for the Eurasia Daily Monitor comments, Kyrgyzstan’s other major partner, Moscow, will certainly not have objected to a little preliminary pressure being applied to Washington.
Attempts to extradite Aidar Akaev have been ongoing for some time now, hindered by Russia’s apparent reluctance to hand him over. A further request for the ex-president’s son to be extradited was made at the end of December, but, unsurprisingly, has not been met with any action on Russia’s part.
Unfortunately Kyrgyzstan was very cooperative with Kazakhstan’s request to extradite Kazakh opposition leader Makhambet Abzhan at the end of December. Kyrgyzstan’s General Prosecutor explained his decision on the grounds that there was no evidence Abzhan faced harrassment or danger in Kazakhstan and that the Kazakhstani authorities has issued a warrant for his arrest on criminal charges. This has been interpreted by many as a clear case of double standards (also known as political pragmatism) in light of the refusal earlier last year to repatriate refugees from Andijan and continuing pressure from Uzbekistan to repatriate the 4 remaining refugees who are in custody in Kyrgyzstan, a move opposed by human rights groups due to fears of physical and judicial abuses.
Slightly more randomly is a report from Ferghana.ru that the Uluu Birimdik (Party of Great Unity) is urging Kyrgyzstan to join the European Union, with an aim to join by 2020. The party leadership’s rationale for this ambitious proposal is that they are
convinced that the time of changes and a new concept of the country’s foreign policy has finally come. Acknowledging as absolutely correct the choice the Kyrgyzes made in the 19th century when they joined the Russian Empire, the party believes that this particular vector of development should be revised now.
No doubt Turkey will be watching closely to see how this idea is received.
Economics, Business
The attempted take over of the Piramida TV and radio station in mid-December was the cause of much concern and speculation, with a petition in support of the station and its staff garnering several thousand signatures and employees staging a protest outside the Kyrgyzstani parliament in Bishkek. The government responded by ordering an inquiry into what had happened, meanwhile there was a fair amount of speculation that President Bakiev’s son, Maksim, was involved - inevitably leading to comparisons with the Akaev family. As IWPR’s article noted, the exact cause of the attempted take over was pretty difficult to pin down, particularly due to the heady combination of interests involved - given that special forces and parliamentary deputies both turned up at the Piramida offices at various times when the take-over attempt started, it is difficult to believe Invest Media’s claims that they had no political motivations for the take-over. On a wider level, the incident heightened fears that media freedom was once again under officially-endorsed (albeit tacit) threat and that the new government has not made as clear a break with so-called Akaevesque methods of rule.
Hot on the heels of the Piramida dispute was the armed seizure of one of the major mobile phone operators, BiTel, following a protracted and disputed legal wrangle, with a Bishkek court overturning the ruling of a British court earlier in the year. The most tangible everyday result of this was the complete loss of service for BiTel and MobiCard customers for several hours, followed by significantly reduced services and reliability, a sudden shortage of top up cards and a corresponding hike in price for the few remaining cards - 200 units went from costing around 210 som to up to 300 som virtually overnight. Part of the problem appears to be that BiTel staff may have either disconnected or damaged equipment before leaving/being evicted from the building. Matters were made even worse in the first week of January by the offer of free calls from the 1st to the 7th, which effectively paralysed the network, as Vechernii Bishkek reported. As usual in these business disputes, it’s difficult to get a reliable picture of the whos, whys and wherefores, which only creates a greater sense of disquiet both amongst the general population and, more significantly from the government’s point of view, amongst the business community; a country with at best shaky rule of law (the court verdict apparently appeared on the web site of one of the company’s involved 20 minutes before it was read out in court according to some reports in the local press) and where armed take-overs occur and are not roundly condemned doesn’t look like a great investment bet. Nevertheless, Russia’s MegaFon is planning on starting operations in the republic next month, offering people an alternative to the only current GSM operator, the dispute-ridden BiTel.
Deals in the energy sector have attracted some press attention, not least the news that Gazprom will be a partner in a new joint venture to explore new natural gas fields in Kyrgyzstan, reports RIA Novosti, which notes that it is anticipated that natural gas production will increase to an annual 40 million cubic metres by 2010.
Further evidence of the economic impact the last year’s upheavals comes from figures released by the National Statistics Committee. Industrial production is down by upto 20%, and exports were down 8% - mainly due to reduced output from the Kumtor Gold Mine. Tourism also suffered, with estimates of a 20% decrease in tourist traffic and a threefold decrease in revenue from Kazakhstani tourists, reports KazInform. However, the picture is not entirely bleak: imports were up 15% and growth was observed in the manufacturing sector and GDP growth for 2006 is predicted to be 8%.
On the subject of gold, the refusal by the Kyrgyzstani government to renew Talas Gold Mining Company’s licence to develop the Jerooy gold mine might still spark a legal wrangle between the company and the government. MosNews reported at the end of December that the decision was originally taken by ex-Prime Minister Nikolai Tanaev due to an alleged lack of investment in the site by the company, and the new government concurred with the decision. However, matters do not appear entirely straightforward, as one would expect, with Oxus Gold PLC, who owns two thirds of the Talas Gold Mining Comapany is prepared to fight the decision. Jerooy, the newsletter of the management and workers at the Jerooy gold mine (not available online - email me if you’d like a photocopy) reported that the company has been advised to remove equipment from the mine prior to commencing a “likely” USD 100 million legal case against the Kyrgyz Government. The article also points out that local newspaper MSN highlighted the potential long and short term economic damage such a case will do to Kyrgyzstan on December 16 (original article in Russian). Oxus is remaining optimistic that the licence will be reinstated according to a press release from January 5 2006.
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on January 28th, 2006 at 1:52 am
Aha!
Found you!
on January 28th, 2006 at 9:01 pm
Thanks, my picture is a bit clearer now! What a roundup!
on February 5th, 2006 at 5:46 pm
1. Referendum on the proposed constitution, or the existing one? The former is very populist, the latter plays (nearly completely) into the hands of the drafters.
2. International Crisis Group is an instrument of a particular US foreign policy establishment. General Wesley Clark is associated with it, which I suppose means it is post-Clinton, but not necessarily.
It’s an open conspiracy, of sorts.
I’m totally unamused att the comments of the “Western entrepreneur” you quoted. Of course foreign businesspeople prefer dictators who can make things happen, rather than dealing with diffuse power. It’s a no-brainer. It’s a cudgel to the head of democracy.
3. It was a palace coup, not a revolution.
4. I think the very fact that they are debating the death penalty is very heartening. Hooray!
5. NGOs: Not surprising. They helped (in some measure) end the last government. Why would the current government want them unchecked?
6. Uzbekistan in the EU? I sorta wish Turkey would lead the Central Asian states (and Azerbaijan and Mongolia) in a “Altaic Alliance”
on February 5th, 2006 at 7:25 pm
1. The referendum will be on the adoption of a revised constitution - the precise text is still in question, but broadly speaking it will be a choice between a parliamentary or presidential system of government. What this will mean in practice is a moot point.
2. ICG’s account of the last few months tallies very much with my experiences out there. Their conclusions leave a lot to be desired in many ways. I wonder in my more cynical moments whether the entire aid/development agenda of the West is an open conspiracy - sometimes certainly looks that way.
I think the “Western Entrepreneur” quotation was being used to illustrate the sense that rather than there having been a change from a “dictator” (however benevolent) to more diffuse power, there is a definite feeling that no-one really holds power now, creating a situation where it is virtually impossible to get anything done in any way as the power structures are completely disjointed. I also suspect many businessmen would rather work with diffuse power - if it is legitimate, effective, non-corrupt and non-arbitrary; the government in KGZ currently does not meet these criteria.
3. The debate over whether or not it was a revolution or not is still open, though I, and many people in KGZ are in complete agreement with you.
4. Death penalty - more heartening that they’ve extended the moratorium. More worrying is the relative lack of attention being paid to the urgent need to improve prison conditions.
5. Re. NGOs - of course. But the point is the concern this has contributed to that the new government may be no better - or even worse - than the Akaev regime.
6. Not UZ in the EU - and doubt it would be suggested considering the current state of relations. It’s a Kyrgyz party that has suggested KGZ should aim to join.
on February 5th, 2006 at 8:30 pm
Thanks for your response.
2. I’ve seen instances where three different Op/Eds will put forward the same ICG plan, but never mention that it is from ICG.
I disagree that businesspeople would rather deal with a Parliament than a dictator. According to some accounts, the largest lobbying effort in US history by American CEOs was MFN status for China. Still, if no one has power (anarchy) then, of course, that’s the worst for business (except the arms business).
5. I guess I never expected it to be better in every way, so, shrug.
6. Sorry for the disconnect there. I still like linguistic groups. After Westphalia(1648) and the Congress of Vienna(1815), it looks like Europe used language as a way to draw the lines on the maps. The Altaic group would be nice to see.
I even wrote a set of blog posts on language and terrorism.
Your generous answers means “I’ll be back.”
on February 5th, 2006 at 8:59 pm
Please do come back - dialogue is one of the main purposes of the New Eurasia project.
Best, CXW
on November 27th, 2006 at 3:06 pm
Creating a situation where it is virtually impossible to get anything done in any way as the power structures are completely disjointed. I also suspect many businessmen would rather work with diffuse power.